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Abstract
This article analyses the inﬂuence of trust on the functioning of a ﬁsh market, where
agents can choose between bidding or exchanging through bilateral transactions. Even if it
is well accepted in economy that trust plays an important role in transactions, its deﬁnition
and its measurement stay, as far as we know, very elusive. Starting from the empirical
analysis of the Boulogne-sur-Mer ﬁsh market, a market where people have the choice between
trading through auctions or bilateral exchanges, we show how the social networks structure
diﬀer between the auction market and the bilateral one . We then propose a measurement
of trust, based on the dynamics of agents encounters. We bring into the light that, when
the transaction links on the auction market reﬂects the economic constraints of the partners,
the relationships on the bilateral market depend on something more. Clearly, the bilateral
transactions result from economics and non economics determinants.
Keywords: market design, trust, social networks.
J.E.L. codes: L14,D85, D47.
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1 Introduction
It is actually largely accepted that markets need suitable institutions to be eﬃcient and a huge
literature has tried to design the "right" institutions. As well summarised by Milgrom (2004),
the idea of auction markets more eﬃcient than the decentralized ones has been largely developed
at the end of the 20th century. Nevertheless, a more recent literature tends to suggest that the
conditions of dominance depend on something more than simple price formation mechanisms.
Clearly, the agents interactions, the structure of the social network and the consequence of the
goods characteristics on agents' behavior inﬂuence the market outcomes.
Starting with the empirical analysis of a particular ﬁsh market (the Boulogne s/mer ﬁsh mar-
ket), our study seeks to underline the role of social interactions on the dynamics of transactions.
Because this market presents a particular organization (co-existence of an auction market and
a bilateral one), it allows to evaluate the inﬂuence of social networks on the market outcomes.
The idea that networks can inﬂuence the markets functioning is not new in economics. Kirman
& Vignes (1990), Kranton & Minehart (2000) or Kranton & Minehart (2001) show how on cer-
tain markets, with a high level of uncertainty on the goods exchanged, linking is essential for
transacting. The place occupied by an agent in the network (in terms of centrality for example)
greatly inﬂuences its economic activity, as shown by Corominas-Bosch (2004), Vignes & Etienne
(2011)) or Fafchamps, Ductor, Goyal & Leij (2013).
This article yearns to look at the emergence and the stability of social links in a market: the
fundamental hypothesis of our study is that trust between agents will inﬂuence the price of their
transactions. In a former article, Milgrom, North & R.Weingast (1990) show that, in the case
of repeatedly trading relationship, gains are possible when there is cooperation. The authors
underline that by establishing a continuing relationship, individuals ensure one other's honest
behaviour: agents beneﬁt more by cooperating and then honesty becomes a necessary condition
in trading relationship. Cooperating can be a dominant strategy, if there exists a credible threat
and this threat could be the disappearance of trust (which corresponds to a come back to the
non cooperative game).
In recent years, social scientists have claimed that trust plays an important role in trans-
actions, as a keystone for cooperation. Trust mixed with trustworthy behaviours turn out to
be crucial for reducing uncertainty (cf. Guiso, Sapienza & Zingales (2008)), risk (cf. Mccabe,
Rigdon & Smith (2007)) and costs (cf. Meidinger, Robin & Ruﬃeux (1999)). However, as Fehr
(2009) remarks, the measurement and the deﬁnition of trust seem to be not fully settled, de-
spite its proposed importance. Moreover, its emergence and the identiﬁcation of its exact role in
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economic interactions stay elusive. Does trust come from good institutions? Or does it help to
reinforce the existing institutions? In what follows, we postulate that trust emerges in a repeated
game (or market) when two agents trade continuously together in a competitive environment:
we show that this phenomenon is particularly important on the negotiated market, where the
information is not centralised and where there exists no signal of information concerning the
quality of the goods.
The question we ask here is how to measure the inﬂuence of trust on the dynamic of a market
exchanges. A fundamental hypothesis of our study is that trust between agents will inﬂuence the
price of their transactions. We deﬁne the level of trust between two persons by the number of
encounters (number of days two persons traded together), relative to the number of encounters
the same persons would done at random. The more two persons exchange together, the higher
the level of trust is. Considering the market through the graph of transactions, we propose an
original trust index based on repeated encounters between buyers and sellers and empirically
estimated from the Boulogne s/mer trade network: this allows us to distinguish between the
random encounters and the ones coming from trust relations. We then compare the two "trust
networks" (auction and bilateral ones)and bring into light that on the auctions, links between
buyers and sellers are mostly random, when they correspond to strategic decisions on the bilat-
eral part of the market. Proximities play a central role on the decentralised market when they are
not signiﬁcant on the centralised one. A ﬁxed-eﬀect GLM model, where the network statistics
are used as variables show that centrality inﬂuences the transactions prices in the same way, on
the auction market and the bilateral ones. However, two other GLM estimations show that trust
diﬀerently inﬂuences the prices and quantities exchanged, according to the market design.
A REVOIR This article is organised as follows: section 2 outlines the main characteristics
of the market and presents the database. The statistical framework is presented in section 3.
Section 5 presents the econometric models and the results. The conclusion follows.
2 The main market features and the data
We study here the functioning of the Boulogne s/mer ﬁsh market, through the analysis of a
detailed database, consisting of 300000 daily transactions on the period 2006-2007.
The market: The Boulogne-sur-Mer ﬁsh market is located in the North of France near
Belgium and considered as the most important ﬁsh market in France in terms of quantity. Its
structure changed over time and for a long period, this market operated as a decentralised one.
In the beginning of the 90s and following E.U. instructions, the market moved to an auction
system, soon rejected by both buyers and sellers, alla arguing that the new market design was
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not in their favour. After collective bargaining between the diﬀerent partners (institutions and
unions of producers), a double mechanism has been introduced the 1st of April 2006, where both
auction and bilateral sub-markets coexist.
This market is a daily one, open 6 days a week. Transactions begin early in the morning.
Sellers are ﬁshermen and buyers are restaurant owners, retail buyers and ﬁsh processors. Buyers
form then an heterogeneous population, facing diﬀerent budget and time constraints. They can
freely buy on the two sub-markets. Each day, sellers have the possibility to choose how to sell
their ﬁsh (centralised or decentralised mechanism). Once the sub-market chosen, sellers cannot
change their strategy until the next day for practical reasons (costs of bring the merchandise
from one part of the market to the other are very high). Mignot, Tedeschi & Vignes (2012) show
the existence of two behaviours: some agents purchase most of the time on the same sub-market,
when others switch regularly. Loyal sellers, the ones who change rarely, are mainly present on
the bilateral market.
The auction market opens at 4 a.m. and always operates at the same place. During the
studied period, the auction was an ascending one on 7 charts at the same time. It is a non coop-
erative game and the prices reﬂect the intensity of competition. Transactions on this sub-market
are anonymous and the buyers are not supposed to interact with the auctioneer, apart from the
prices formation mechanism. The time constraint is high, all transactions take place in 4 hours.
Important volumes of ﬁsh are traded and transactions occur at a fast rate.
On the bilateral market, the prices are not displayed and emerge from a bargaining process.
Buyers, who are retailers are looking for speciﬁc species, that correspond to their expected de-
mand. Here agents have diﬀerent source of private information, depending on their past history
and their intensity to bargain and transact.
The data: 200 boats are registered in this market and are considered as sellers. 100 buyers
purchase regularly, most of them on both sub-markets. The database we use covers a year and a
half (2006-2007) where both sub-markets coexist. For each transaction, the date, the species, the
characteristics of the traded ﬁsh (size, presentation, quality), buyer's and seller's identities, the
type of trade mechanism (auction or negotiated), the quantity exchanged and the transaction
price are known. In what follows, we focus on the post-reorganisation period, to evaluate the
diﬀerences in the inﬂuence of trust on the outcomes of the two market designs. The analysis of
the database tells a story of heterogeneity. First statistical results show that both buyers and
sellers diﬀer in terms of quality and quantities exchanged.
4
Moreover, the two submarkets (auctions and negotiated) have an equal importance: same
agents transact on the two "submarkets" and the same types of ﬁsh are sold through both
mechanisms (80 species of ﬁsh traded).
3 The framework
After the introduction of the double mechanism, traders can decide to play randomly between the
two submarkets or to favour one. Auctions do not allow loyal strategies unlike the decentralised
market where people can choose with whom they exchange.
3.1 The bilateral market
3.1.1 Market
Consider a bilateral market, where there is no arbitrage, composed by N buyers i, with i = 1...N
and M sellers s, with s = 1...M who buy and sell regularly during τ periods, τ=1...T. At each
period τ , a buyer (seller) can be present or not. When present, he can exchange with one or
more sellers (buyers). In each bargaining bin, players trade with a partner they trust or with
one randomly matched.
3.1.2 Matching
• The diagram below represents the diﬀerent possibilities for each couple (seller, buyer)
present at time τ on the market:
(i, j)
Both are present
on the market
Pi,j = 1
One or more transactions
Matching
Li,j = 1
No Transaction
No matching
Li,j = 0
At least one is not
present on the market
Pi,j = 0
In the rest of the
paper, we use the following notations:
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 mTi,j=
∑T
τ=1 Li,j,τ : Number of days a couple meets and transacts (we will refer to it
as number of encounters)
 MTi,j=
∑T
τ=1 Pi,j,τ : Number of days a couple is present on the market
 ti,j : Number of transactions between a buyer i and a seller j
 Tk: Number of total transactions for a trader k
 Di,τ : Degree of buyer i at time τ (number of sellers linked to i at time τ)
 ni,τ : Number of buyers present on the market at time τ
 nj,τ : Number of sellers present on the market at time τ
 Dj,τ : Degree of sellerj at time τ (number of sellers linked to i at time τ)
3.1.3 The trust
Trust is deﬁned as a stock and strongly depends on the number of encounters between diﬀerent
people. The more a couple exchanges, the higher is their level of trust. The ratio below Ri,j
allows to associate a level of trust to each potential couple (i, j) of the market.
RTi,j =
mTi,j
MTi,j
−
∑T
τ=1[
Dj,τ
ni,τ
+
Di,τ
nj,τ
− Dj,τ∗Di,τnj,τ∗ni,τ ]
MTi,j
(1)
This ratio can be explained by dividing it to two expressions. The ﬁrst quotient explains the
strategic decision for linking and the second one represents the random choice.
The ﬁrst term
mTi,j
MTi,j
shows the probability for a buyer i to transact with a chosen seller j. The
second one
∑T
τ=1[
Dj,τ
ni,τ
+
Di,τ
nj,τ
−Dj,τ ∗Di,τ
nj,τ ∗ni,τ ]
MTi,j
shows the probability for the buyer i to transact with the
seller j if the seller j is chosen randomly. As Granovetter (1973) said, mutual conﬁding matters.
Hence, the second term of equation 1 considers both agents degrees on a market where buyers
and sellers can both choose between trusting behaviour or not.
3.2 Stylised facts
Equation 1 proposed in this article is used to verify that agents behaviours are not similar on
both submarkets. Its purpose is not only to illustrate the agents behaviour but also to pinpoint
that trust level is not the same and agents are more strategic and make more choices on the
negotiated market.
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The trust index can take negative values as well as positive ones. A negative ratio shows that
a buyer chooses in a random way his seller. He thinks less in choosing from whom to buy. The
probability for a buyer i to choose randomly his seller j is more important that the probability
of making choices. Whereas for a positive ratio, the probability for making choices is greater
than the probability of choosing randomly. Thus, the buyer decides about his seller. He makes
more choices, he distincts and prefers between the sellers on the market.
Figure 1 displays the distribution of the random vs trust ratio (equation 1) on the negotiated
and on the auction market.
Figure 1: The distribution of the trust ratio on the negotiated (left) and the auction (right)
submarkets
Figure 1 shows the distribution of the random vs trust ratio on both submarkets: the nego-
tiated and the auction submarkets (Table 1). We observe that on the auction submarket, the
negative values are more important. Technically speaking, a negative value correspond to the
fact that some people are matched randomly.
Looking at the random vs trust ratio (equation 1), we remark that on auction submarket,
agents choose more randomly from whom to buy and they do not make much choices. Oppositely,
agents on negotiated submarket make more choice. Figure 1 highlights more negative ratios on
the auction market and more positive ratios on the negotiated market.
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auction negotiated
Mean -0.17 -0.10
Std Dev 0.14 0.10
Kurtosis 8.19 17.76
Skewness 1.5 2.48
Table 1: Main statistics of the distribution of the trust vs random ratio on the negotiated and
the auction market
As both variances on the auction and the negotiated markets are not the same (table 2),
we test the equality of means on both submarket using the Satterthwaite method for unequal
variances.
Satterthwaite test shows that the mean values for the trust versus random ratio on both sub-
markets are signiﬁcantly diﬀerent. The mean on the negotiated submarket is more important
than on the auction submarket.
Equality of Variances
Method F Value Pr>F
Folded F 1.82 <.0001
Methode t value Pr>|t |
Satterthwaite -46.81 <.0001
Table 2: Equality of variances and Satterthwaite test
4 Network analysis
4.1 Bipartite network
This section analyses, in a bipartite approach, the set of links between people as a social network
(heterogenous individuals).
The purpose here is to compare the diﬀerences in terms of relations between buyers and sell-
ers between both submarkets. To do so, we build for each submarket a bipartite network formed
of two types of nodes, buyers and sellers, on the total period.
We describe a graph as a set of nodes where buyers (the grey nodes) and sellers (the back
nodes) interact and we track the intensity of the relation among people1.
We measure the link between two nodes using the trust index (equation 1) deﬁned in the upper
section.
We consider in what follows all the link that are created between agents when making choices (we
1the grey nodes are represented by green nodes, and the back nodes by red color
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do not consider the links created by random matching). Hence a link is formed between a buyer
and a seller for a ratio higher than 0,1, otherwise there is no link. This threshold is chosen because
it allows us to distinguish between a random matching (the set of these matchings describe a
quasi-complete network) and a strategic one.
Linki,j =
1 if Rj,i ≥ 0.10 else (2)
At ﬁrst sight, both graphs in ﬁgure 2 are not similar. On the negotiated submarket, some
buyers have a set of "preferred" sellers, unlike the auction submarket where all the sellers and
buyers are centralised.
Figure 2: A bipartite graph for auction (right) and negotiated (left) submarkets: sellers are in
black, buyers in grey
auction negotiated
Nodes 272 278
Links 592 629
Density 0.016 0.015
Assortativity -0.0023 0.0165
Table 3: Networks statistics
The density of a network is the fraction between the number of created links and the number
of total possible links. The density value is between 0 and 1. A density close to 1 reﬂects a very
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dense network with an important number of links and when it is closed to 0, the network has
very few links. Both submarkets have a similar density equal to 0.015.
Do high degree nodes tend to connect with other high degree nodes, or do they prefer to establish
a link with low degree ones? A diﬀerent measure used in the literature is the assortativity.
Therefore, this coeﬃcient explains the capacity of a node to create a link with a node that is
similar. It measures the correlation between two nodes giving a value between -1 and +1. Our
assortativity ratio is not the same for both submarkets. It is negative for the auction market
(-0.023) and that could be explained by important buyers who transact with many small sellers
or important sellers (rational ones) who sell to many small buyers what explain ﬁgure 2. The
assortativity ratio is positive on the negotiated submarket that could suggest that links are based
on something other than pure economics relationships; and that could be clariﬁed by important
buyers who transact with many important sellers (rational ones) or small sellers who sell to many
small buyers.
4.2 Projected network
To better estimate the role of centrality, we project now the bipartite network on homogenous
one.
A buyer is linked to another buyer if both of them transact with at least the same seller (one or
more). As well, sellers are linked if they transact with at least the same buyer (one or more).
Figure 3 and 4 picture buyers and sellers projected network.
Buyers projected network
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Figure 3: Buyers projected network (auction (left) negotiated (right))
auction negotiated
Nodes 95 88
Links 866 998
Density 0.1939 0.2607
Assortativity 0.205 0.0501
Table 4: Buyers projected graph statistics
Even thought their is no remarkable diﬀerence between both submarkets for numbers of nodes,
a diﬀerence can be noted for the number of links as for the density. Buyers on the negotiated
submarket are more linked, hence they have more common sellers. One interpretation is that
buyers visit more sellers on the decentralised market. The assortativity is lightly higher on the
auction market. To explain the higher density on the negotiated market, we calculate for each
buyer and seller how many days they take to return to the market. In other words, we determine
for each buyer and seller the time period between two presence on each submarket. In average
a buyer returns to the auction market each 19 days and each 5 days to the negotiated one. As
for the seller, they sell in average each 14 days on the auction market and each 6 days on the
negotiated one (Table 5) .
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Buyer Seller
Auction Negotiated Auction Negotiated
Mean 13.78 6.26 18.59 4.87
Std Dev 34.08 15.59 17.19 3.67
Kurtosis 17.53 40.29 6.12 20.97
Skewness 4.08 5.90 2.01 3.91
Table 5: Descriptive statistics buyer and seller sides
Sellers projected network
Figure 4: Sellers projected network (auction (left) negotiated (right))
Sellers projected graph shows the number of links created on auction and negotiated sub-
markets is the same which explains the same density. The assortativity on the auction market is
twice the one on the negotiated market (see table 6) and on both submarkets they are positive.
This is in line with the assortativity level on the bipartite network (table 3) for the negotiated
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submarket; the positive assortativity close to zero suggests that links are based on something
other than pure economics relationships. Linked sellers have similar characteristics and therefore
are connected to similar buyers.
auction negotiated
Nodes 173 189
Links 2710 3321
Density 0.1821 0.1869
Assortativity 0.1 0.04
Table 6: Sellers projected graph statistics
5 The Econometric Models
We now explore how the trust propensity and the individual position in the social network
inﬂuences the outcome of the market. A ﬁrst model evaluates the inﬂuence of Bonacich (1987)
centrality and betweenness on transactions prices. Models two, three and four evaluates the
inﬂuence of the trust ratio as deﬁned section 3 on the quantities and prices exchanged by pairs
of buyers and sellers. In this section, we will see if our ratio aﬀects in a diﬀerent way the prices
and the quantity on both submarkets, and the inﬂuence of centrality on prices.
5.1 Model 1: Centrality analysis
We begin by analysing the eﬀects of centralities on prices. The objective is to see if the position
of the agents in the networks inﬂuences the prices they will pay (or get). Because of seasonality
(see Mignot et al. (2012)), we know that the price of a transaction also depends on the day of the
week (Weekdayk). We control for the global signiﬁcance of the 80 species (Speciesk) exchanged.
The explained variable is the price of a transaction k . Each transaction k involves a buyer, a
seller and a species. We also control for the identity of the seller (boatk) and the buyer (buyerk).
The centrality used are the Bonacich centrality (bonk) and the betweenness centrality (betk)
Pk = β1+β2·Bonk+β3·Betk+β4·Speciesk+β5·Weekdayk+β6·boatk+β7·buyerk+β8·moisk+vi,t
(3)
vit = µi + δit, µi ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2µi), δit ∼ i.i.d.(0, σ2δ ) (4)
The results
We use this model with the centrality coeﬃcient of the four homogenous graphs, 3 and 4. At
ﬁrst glance, the results are quite paradoxical. concerning the sellers homogenous network (the
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one where two sellers are linked when they share one or more buyers), the diﬀerent centralities
negatively and signiﬁcantly inﬂuence the prices. The more central a seller is (the more buyers
he shares with competitors), the lower the prices are (See table 7). If these results correspond
to some economic evidence, they remain paradoxical in the fact that they are identical on both
submarkets. Despite diﬀerent information structures, the place where people are aﬀects their
outcomes. Concerning the buyers homogenous network (where buyers are linked when they share
at least one seller), there is non signiﬁcant eﬀect of their position neither on the auction market
nor on the bilateral one (See table 8). This suggests that personal relationships, which are strong
enough to design two diﬀerent networks (corresponding to the two diﬀerent submarkets) play an
other role than a pure economic one.
Auction Negotiated
Parameter coeﬃcients Std err Pr > |t| coeﬃcient Std err Pr > |t|
Intercept 1.36 1779 0.999 1.14 2338 0.999
Bonacich -0.56 1196 0.999 -0.24 0.098 0.013
Betweeness -0.20 496 0.999 0.058 0.021 0.007
Table 7: Sellers on auction and bilateral submarkets
Auction Negotiated
Parameter coeﬃcients Std err Pr > |t| coeﬃcient Std err Pr > |t|
Intercept -1.02 0.298 0.0006 2.13 1032 0.999
Bonacich -0.29 0.057 <.0001 0.44 183 0.999
Betweeness 0.197 0.045 <.0001 0.077 141.42 0.999
Table 8: Buyers on auction and bilateral submarkets
5.2 Model 2: Inﬂuence of trust index on prices
Pi,j,τ,t = β1+β2 ·Ri,j+β3 ·i+β4 ·j+β5 ·Weekdayτ+β6 ·yeark+β7 ·moisk+β8 ·Speciek+vi,t (5)
Negotiated Auction
Price Coef Std Dev Pr > t Coef Std Dev Pr > t
Intercept 4.94 0.43 <.0001 2.80 0.52 <.0001
Ri,j 0.22 0.034 <.0001 0.075 0.045 0.09
Table 9: Estimation results for the negotiated and auction submarkets
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This section seeks to explain how the trust index (equation 1) inﬂuences prices on auction and
negotiated submarkets throughout time. To do so, we estimate the price transactions in a GLM
model. We control the global signiﬁcant of the 80 species, the weekdays, the years, the months,
the buyers and the sellers. The explained variable is the price of a transaction per couple and day.
The results are given in table 9. As it can be observed, signiﬁcant coeﬃcient are on the
negotiated submarket and not on the auction one. We verify a positive relation between the
prices and the trust index on the negotiated submarket. Hence trust has no eﬀect on the auction
submarket but it increase price on the negotiated one. When people trusts each other, they get
higher prices with time.
5.3 Model 3: Inﬂuence of the number of encounters on quantity
To explain if the numbers of encounters inﬂuences quantity, we compute the relation between
the quantities exchanged Qi,j and the number of encounters between a buyer and a seller mi,j
on the auction and the negotiated submarkets.
An econometric model is used to evaluate if trust aﬀects diﬀerently the outcomes of the
transactions for both submarkets. In this model we use:
• The quantity exchanged between each couple: Qj,i
• The number of encounters between (j, i) on both submarkets : mj,i
We estimate the following equation:
Qj,i = β1 + β2mj,i ++β3m
2
j,i + uj,i (6)
where Qj,i=
∑T
t=1 q(j,i),t
for (j, i)=1,...,C (where C is the number of all the created couples). We explore here the
inﬂuence of the diﬀerent components of trust ratio on the quantity.
Negotiated Auction
Log quantity Coef Standard Error Pr>|t| Coef Standard Error Pr>|t|
Intercept 3.502 0.0022 0.000 3.66 0.022 0.000
Log encounters 1.35 0.025 0.000 1.33 0.027 0.000
Log2 Encounters -0.013 0.006 0.02 -0.000 0.006 0.9104
Table 10: Estimation results for the negotiated and auction submarkets
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We remark that, on the auction and the negotiated submarket, the quantity exchanged in-
creases with the number of encounters. It grows with an increasing rate at the auction market
and a decreasing one on the negotiated market. So when a couple meet more frequently, it is
obvious that they exchange more quantity on the auction market, when it is not the case on the
negotiated market. The results of the estimation are given in table 10 . We observe signiﬁcant
coeﬃcients for all the explaining variables. We verify a negative relation between the quantity
and the encounters2 on the negotiated submarket and a positive one on the auction submarket.
To better understand trust results, we analyse in what follows, how the prices are aﬀected
by our ratio.
5.4 Model 4: Inﬂuence of the number of encounters on price
This model explains the relation between the price and the trust ratio. where
Pj,i =
∑
pj,i ∗ qj,i∑
qj,i
(7)
is the price index for the diﬀerent species exchanged.
Pj,i = α1 + α2mj,i + α3m
2
j,i + uj,i (8)
Negotiated Auction
Log Price Coef Standard Error Pr>|t| Coef Standard Error Pr>|t|
Intercept 1.059 0.015 0.000 1.118 0.016 0.000
Log Encounters 0.227 0.017 0.000 0.11 0.019 0.000
Log Encounters2 -0.037 0.004 0.000 -0.217 0.005 0.000
Table 11: Estimation results for the negotiated and the auction submarkets
As we can see, there is no signiﬁcant diﬀerence between both submarket at a price level.
When agents meet more, prices get higher.
5.5 Model 5: Inﬂuence of the number of encounters on price and quantity
for the diﬀerent categories
In order to understand why a diﬀerence exists at a quantity level and not at a price level,
we estimate both regressions for the diﬀerent categories of the species. We diﬀerentiate three
categories: the ﬁrst one, "category auction" includes the species that are more expensive on
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auction submarket, while category two, "category negotiated" is composed of ﬁsh that are more
expensive on negotiated submarket and the third category "category neutral" combines ﬁsh that
have no signiﬁcant diﬀerence in terms of prices between both submarkets.
Log quantity Negotiated Auction
Category Auction Coef Std Dev Pr > |t| Coef Std dev Pr > |t|
Intercept 3.217 0.025 <.0001 3.36 0.026 <.0001
Log Encounters 1.414 0.034 <.0001 1.304 0.035 <.0001
Log2 encounters -0.012 0.009 0.1905 0.0244 0.009 0.0068
Category Negotiated Coef Std Dev Pr > |t| Coef Std dev Pr > |t|
Intercept 3.01 0.173 <.0001 3.10 0.02 <.0001
Log Encounters 1.313 0.024 <.0001 1.244 0.034 <.0001
Log2 encounters -0.23 0.006 0.0003 -0.01 0.011 0.3643
Category Neutral Coef Std Dev Pr > |t| Coef Std dev Pr > |t|
Intercept 3.41 0.026 <.0001 3.67 0.027 <.0001
Log encounters 1.44 0.036 <.0001 1.39 0.037 <.0001
Log2 encounters -0.016 0.001 0.0996 -0.022 0.009 0.0198
Table 12: Estimation results for the negotiated and the auction submarkets
Log Price Negotiated Auction
Category Auction Coef Std Dev Pr > |t| Coef Std dev Pr > |t|
Intercept 0.925 0.016 <.0001 0.864 0.018 <.0001
Log Encounters 0.194 0.022 <.0001 0.222 0.024 <.0001
Log2 encounters -.049 0.006 <.0001 -0.434 0.006 <.0001
Category Negotiated Coef Std Dev Pr > |t| Coef Std dev Pr > |t|
Intercept 1.374 0.016 <.0001 1.432 0.0176 <.0001
Log Encounters 0.127 0.022 <.0001 0.0835 0.03 0.0058
Log2 encounters 0.016 0.0058 0.7775 -0.05 0.01 <.0001
Category Neutral Coef Std Dev Pr > |t| Coef Std dev Pr > |t|
Intercept 0.752 0.017 <.0001 0.766 0.019 <.0001
Log encounters 0.298 0.023 <.0001 0.187 0.026 <.0001
Log2 encounters -.057 0.006 <.0001 -.016 0.007 0.0198
Table 13: Estimation results for the negotiated and the auction submarkets
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Tables 12 and 13 give the results for price and quantity regression for the three categories
of ﬁshes for both submarkets. The diﬀerence that should be noted between the submarkets,
is marked in bold. What we observe is that for all the categories for both submarkets, prices
increase at an decreasing rate with the number of encounters. But only one category should be
noticed: the species that are more expensive and sold on the negotiated submarket increase but
not with the same rate as all the other categories (there is no signiﬁcant relation between Log2
encounters and the price).
As for the quantity, it increases at a decreasing rate for all the categories for both submarkets, but
it increases at a increasing rate for the species that are more expensive and sold on the auction
submarket. We note no signiﬁcant relation between the Log2 encounters and the quantity for
the species that are more expensive on auction submarket but sold on the negotiated one, for the
species that are more expensive on the negotiated submarket but sold on the auction one and
ﬁnally for the species that have no diﬀerence in terms of prices between submarkets but sold on
the negotiated one.
6 Conclusion
This article shows how on a particular market where the level of uncertainty is quite high and
where people meet regularly, trust can aﬀect the way the transactions are accomplished. Even
with a very simple measure of trust propensity, we obtain quite interesting results. In all our
empirical work, we refer to the level of trust between two persons by the number of encounters
(number of day two persons traded together), relative to the number of days these two persons
were present on the market. When two people exchange more together, they signiﬁcantly reach
higher levels of trust.
We bring into the light the fact that links between people depend on something else than
pure economic determinants. Network statistics on a bipartite graph, show that assortativity on
auction market clearly depends on some economic strategies (highly connected buyers trade with
poorly connected sellers).When we project the bipartite network on two diﬀerent homogenous
networks (a buyer one and a seller one), we observe that the density on the negotiated market
is higher than on the auction one. This is due to the fact that people are more present on the
negotiated market than on the auction one. Driving an econometric analysis, we observe quite
paradoxical results. Concerning the sellers homogenous network (the one where two sellers are
linked when they share one or more buyers), the diﬀerent centralities inﬂuence negatively and
signiﬁcantly prices. The more central a seller is (the more buyers he shares with competitors),
the lower the prices are. If these results correspond to some economic evidence, they remain
paradoxical in the fact that they are identical on both markets. Despite diﬀerent information
structures, the place where people are aﬀects their outcomes. Concerning the buyers homogenous
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network (where buyers are linked when they share at least one seller), there is non signiﬁcant
eﬀect of their position neither on the auction market nor on the bilateral one. This suggests that
personal relationships, which are strong enough to design two diﬀerent networks (corresponding
to the two diﬀerent submarkets) play an other role than a pure economic one.
Looking at the inﬂuence of encounters on the quantities exchanged by pairs of agents (buyer/
seller), a GL model shows that this eﬀect is diﬀerent between the two markets. When we observe
a concave eﬀect on the negotiated market, we see an increasing eﬀect on the auction market.
It seems that encounters on the negotiated market have not the same consequences than on
the auction market. Concerning the prices, we ﬁnd a no signiﬁcant diﬀerences between the
submarket. But for the rust versus random ratio, we remark that it had no signiﬁcant eﬀect on
price on the auction submarket, but a positive eﬀect on the negotiated submarket. Can we relate
this diﬀerence to the quality of ﬁshes exchanged or to overconﬁdence on the negotiated submarket.
This work is a very preliminary one but let the door open to more sophisticated estimations on
the role of trust and the understanding of the emergence of trustworthy relationships.
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